While martial law lasts, no all-Ukrainian referendum may be called or held and the Constitution may not be amended, so even an Article 73 referendum route is closed

The Gist

Under martial law, Ukrainian law forbids holding any national referendum, and the Constitution forbids amending itself. So even if a referendum could in principle approve giving up territory, it cannot happen while martial law lasts, and neither can a treaty that would need such a referendum. Parliament could change the referendum ban with an ordinary law, but it has not, and a treaty that conflicts with the Constitution would still need an amendment that cannot be made under martial law.

Conclusion

For as long as martial law is in force, Article 157 forbids amending the Constitution, and a treaty ceding a region, which would contravene the Constitution, could bind Ukraine under Article 9 only after such an amendment. That entrenched bar alone closes the treaty route, including a treaty approved by an Article 73 referendum, whatever Article 73 otherwise permits. Article 20 of the referendum law and Article 19 of the martial law statute add a second, statutory layer by forbidding any all-Ukrainian referendum; ordinary law could repeal that layer, and none has, but repeal would not lift the constitutional bar.

Premises

Article 20 of the 2021 Law on the All-Ukrainian Referendum provides that if martial law or a state of emergency is introduced in Ukraine or in any part of it, calling and holding an all-Ukrainian referendum is prohibited; a referendum process under way stops when the martial-law decree takes effect and restarts from the beginning 30 days after martial law ends [2,16].
Article 19 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law separately prohibits, under martial law, amending the Constitution and holding all-Ukrainian and local referendums [3].
Article 157 provides that the Constitution shall not be amended under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency [1]. The Venice Commission has read that rule as clearly prohibiting the adoption of amendments while martial law applies, so that temporary emergency conditions do not produce permanent constitutional change [11].
Under the referendum law, an all-Ukrainian referendum approving a ratification law is the form a treaty changing Ukraine's territory must take, and the Law on International Treaties requires referendum approval of such a ratification law; a treaty contravening the Constitution also needs a prior amendment under Article 9 [2,20,1].
No law permitting a referendum under martial law had been adopted as of November 2026; a Rada working group formed in December 2025 was still preparing legislation for elections and referendums in a special or post-war period [23,24,16].

Assumptions

The ban on holding a referendum under martial law is statutory (the 2021 referendum law and the martial law statute), not constitutional, so the Rada could lift it by ordinary law; the ban on constitutional amendment under martial law is constitutional (Article 157).
Even if the statutory bar were lifted, observers doubt that a referendum held during active hostilities could meet international standards or the referendum law's 50 percent turnout requirement, given displaced voters, voters abroad and service members.
The bar is temporal: when martial law ends, the referendum and amendment routes reopen and must be tested against Articles 2, 9, 73 and 157 on their merits.

Analysis

Reasoning breaks down

Outdated

The texts block ratification, but not every step of the treaty route

The law clearly bars an all-Ukrainian referendum and any constitutional amendment while martial law lasts. But the conclusion also says the whole treaty route is closed, and the cited provisions only stop the approval and ratification stage. A treaty could still be negotiated or signed with ratification deferred, and the claim that a cession would need a prior amendment is stated as an 'if', not shown. The referendum ban is also ordinary law that the Rada could repeal, so the closure holds for today's law and not as a lasting block.

Why

If a cession treaty can only take effect through a referendum-approved ratification law, the treaty route is closed at that stage for as long as the statutory ban stands.

Argument type: Deductive.

Potential Fallacies

Scope creep (overbroad conclusion) (Argument as a whole) — The premises block calling a referendum and amending the Constitution, which are the approval and ratification steps. They do not clearly block negotiating or signing a treaty whose ratification waits until martial law ends. Describing the entire treaty route as unavailable merges the ratification stage with the whole process.
Borrowed authority (Premise 3) — The Venice Commission document cited for reading Article 157 is a brief on anti-corruption appointments. Its remarks on the amendment ban are incidental, so the institution's prestige adds more weight than the source carries. The plain text of Article 157 is clear without it.
Mild argument from absence (Premise 5) — That no permitting law exists is inferred from reports of preparatory work, not from a dated check of the legislative register. The inference is probably right, but the sources do not strictly establish it for the stated date.
Headline overstatement (Argument as a whole) — The title states categorically that the route is closed, while the body admits that the referendum ban is ordinary law and repealable. Only the amendment bar is constitutionally entrenched. The qualified conclusion is more defensible than the headline.

Counterarguments

The conclusion extends from barred referendums and amendments to the entire treaty route, but the texts only block the ratification and approval stage. Nothing in the argument answers the possibility of signing a treaty now with ratification deferred, or of an arrangement that is not a formal cession.

Without this step, nothing else in the argument reaches the conclusion.

Strongest challenge: Argument as a whole (Medium impact) — The cited provisions block ratification by referendum and constitutional amendment. They do not block negotiating, initialling or signing a treaty, or structuring a settlement as a conditional, deferred or non-cession arrangement such as a ceasefire line or de facto control. So the whole treaty route is not shown to be unavailable, only its ratification stage.
Premise 5 (Medium impact) — The 'no permitting law' claim is a dated negative fact supported by indirect sources. A law adopted shortly before or after the cut-off would remove the referendum bar, leaving only the amendment bar.
Premise 3 (Low impact) — The Venice Commission document concerns appointments to anti-corruption bodies, so it lends only borrowed authority to the reading of Article 157. The clear constitutional text still carries the point.
Assumption 1 (Medium impact) — Because the referendum ban is ordinary law, the Rada could repeal or suspend it by simple majority, possibly quickly under negotiating pressure or through the special-period law already being drafted. The closure then reflects a legislative choice, not a lasting legal barrier. The argument concedes this, but its title still reads as categorical.
Premise 4 (Medium impact) — Whether a cession treaty contravenes the Constitution at all is an open interpretive question. If Article 73 is read as authorising a referendum on territorial change directly, no prior amendment is needed and the Article 157 limb becomes irrelevant, leaving only the repealable statutory bar.
Argument as a whole (Low impact) — Under a doctrine of necessity or in an extreme external-pressure scenario, courts or institutions might treat the bars as overridden or read them purposively so as not to block a peace settlement approved by the people.

Suggested Improvements

Conclusion: The treaty-route closure is stated more broadly than the premises establish. — Say that ratification of a cession treaty is unavailable while martial law lasts, and acknowledge that signing with deferred ratification, or arrangements short of formal cession, are not addressed. The bars operate at the approval and ratification stage, not on negotiating or signing.
Premise 5: The 'no law adopted' claim rests on indirect sources dated before the stated cut-off. — Cite a dated check of the legislative register, or state the claim as of the latest source date. The referendum limb depends on the statutory bar still being in force at the stated date.
Premise 3: The Venice Commission brief is on a different subject. — Rely on the text of Article 157, or cite a Venice Commission or Constitutional Court source that addresses the martial-law amendment ban directly. Borrowed authority adds little to a clear constitutional text and invites criticism.
Premise 4: It treats a cession as contravening the Constitution without argument. — Address both readings, and note that Article 157 also contains a separate, permanent limit on amendments that violate Ukraine's indivisibility. Whether Article 73 authorises a referendum on territory without a prior amendment is contested.
Assumption 1: The title says 'closed' while the body concedes that the referendum ban can be repealed. — Reword the title to say the route is closed under current law while martial law lasts, with only the amendment ban constitutionally fixed. A categorical headline overstates a limb that is only a statutory choice.

Scenario Tests

The Rada passes a special-period law permitting referendums under martial law. (Challenges) — The referendum limb falls, since the ban is statutory. Only the amendment ban remains, and it matters only if a cession would need an amendment.
A ceasefire is agreed but martial law stays in force. (Supports) — The bars are tied to martial law, not to active fighting, so the referendum and amendment routes stay closed until martial law ends.
Martial law is ended and, after the 30-day wait, a referendum process restarts. (Neutral) — The argument itself says the bar is temporal. The routes reopen and must then be tested against Articles 2, 9, 73 and 157.
A settlement is signed with ratification conditioned on the post-martial-law procedures. (Challenges) — Only the ratification stage is blocked, so the claim that the entire treaty route is unavailable would need narrowing.

Coherence & Relevance

The argument is well structured. It separates the statutory bar from the constitutional bar, confines itself to current law, and treats the bars as temporal. Its coherence weakens at the final step, where the bans on approving a referendum and amending the Constitution are read as closing the entire treaty route. The title is also stronger than the qualified conclusion.

Article 20 of the 2021 Law on the All-Ukrainian Referendum provides that if martial law or a state of emergency is introduced in Ukraine or in any part of it, calling and holding an all-Ukrainian referendum is prohibited; a referendum process under way stops when the martial-law decree takes effect and restarts from the beginning 30 days after martial law ends [2,16]. (Strong) — None for the referendum bar itself. Its repealability is conceded.
Article 19 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law separately prohibits, under martial law, amending the Constitution and holding all-Ukrainian and local referendums [3]. (Strong) — Largely redundant with P1, since both are statutes that one ordinary law could change.
Article 157 provides that the Constitution shall not be amended under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency [1]. The Venice Commission has read that rule as clearly prohibiting the adoption of amendments while martial law applies, so that temporary emergency conditions do not produce permanent constitutional change [11]. (Strong) — Fully relevant to the amendment limb. It matters to the treaty route only if a cession needs a prior amendment.
Under the referendum law, an all-Ukrainian referendum approving a ratification law is the form a treaty changing Ukraine's territory must take, and the Law on International Treaties requires referendum approval of such a ratification law; a treaty contravening the Constitution also needs a prior amendment under Article 9 [2,20,1]. (Strong) — It links the bans to the treaty route but does not show that every settlement is a cession or that a cession contravenes the Constitution.
No law permitting a referendum under martial law had been adopted as of November 2026; a Rada working group formed in December 2025 was still preparing legislation for elections and referendums in a special or post-war period [23,24,16]. (Moderate) — It is a dated snapshot and shows nothing about future change.

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