Western Policy Toward Russia Is Entrenching Putin's Rule by Alienating Ordinary Russians and the Opposition
Source: Leonid Ragozin. "The West Is Only Helping Putin Consolidate Support." October 4, 2026. jacobin.com
The Gist
The author argues that Western countries are shooting themselves in the foot: by using harsh rhetoric, punishing ordinary Russians while sparing rich pro-Putin oligarchs, and backing a flawed, exclusionary 'opposition' group, they're actually making Putin look like the only option for many Russians. He also argues the West missed a real chance for peace in 2022 by insisting on militarily defeating Russia, a goal that later proved unachievable.
Conclusion
Western policies—jingoistic rhetoric, indiscriminate sanctions on ordinary Russians, support for Ukraine's military defeat of Russia, and mistreatment of genuine antiwar Russian activists—are counterproductive, strengthening Putin's domestic support rather than undermining it.
Premises
- Putin has used the war to crush Russian civil society and opposition, forcing most activists into exile where they have little ability to effect change inside Russia.
- Western politicians' rhetoric about defeating or dismembering Russia, along with Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian cities, pushes Russians of all political stripes toward supporting Putin rather than opposing him.
- The West treats wealthy pro-Kremlin oligarchs more leniently (e.g., the EU lifting sanctions on Usmanov and Fridman) than it treats genuine antiwar activists and ordinary Russian citizens, who face broad, often xenophobic sanctions and legal setbacks (e.g., the ECHR dismissing 879 cases filed by Russian citizens).
- The 'Russian opposition' structures that Western institutions actually support (e.g., the Council of Europe's Platform for Dialogue with Russian Democratic Forces) are compromised—led by figures with xenophobic views and excluding the opposition group with genuine popular support (Navalny's FBK) while including figures tied to extremist and violent elements.
- In fall 2022 ('Milley's window'), a viable opportunity existed for a negotiated peace, but the Biden administration and allies like Sanders rejected diplomacy in favor of pursuing Russia's military defeat, a goal that General Milley deemed unrealistic and which the failed 2023 counteroffensive subsequently confirmed.
- Statements by Western officials (e.g., EU's Arianna Podesta) blaming ordinary Russians collectively for the war reflect a punitive, undifferentiated stance that undermines any meaningful distinction between the regime and the populace.
Assumptions
- Russian public opinion and political behavior are significantly responsive to perceived external threats and Western rhetoric, such that hostile rhetoric measurably increases support for Putin.
- A negotiated peace in 2022 would have produced a better outcome for Ukraine and the region than continued fighting, and this counterfactual can be reliably assessed with hindsight.
- The Russian opposition in exile, despite having limited domestic presence, remains a meaningful political force whose treatment by the West has strategic significance for Russia's political future.
- Western policymakers are primarily driven by a 'war industry' and its associated media/think-tank ecosystem rather than by strategic necessity or moral imperatives tied to Ukraine's defense.
- Sanctions and rhetoric aimed at Russia as a whole are inherently less effective or more harmful than more targeted approaches would be.