We Cannot Achieve Perfect Security Without Destroying Open Democracy
Source: Tom Nichols. "Security at the Washington Hilton Did Its Job - The Atlantic." April 26, 2026. www.theatlantic.com
The Gist
After a thwarted attack at a Washington dinner, some people want to add more security everywhere. But the author argues we can't make everything perfectly safe without turning America into a police state where leaders hide from citizens like dictators do.
Conclusion
Americans should accept that living in an open democracy involves unavoidable risks rather than implementing extreme security measures that would fundamentally transform our society into a garrison state
Premises
- The security system at the White House Correspondents' Dinner worked as designed - it prevented the attacker from reaching the president
- Zero-defect security thinking leads to counterproductive measures like excessive airport security that don't meaningfully improve safety
- Extreme security measures would require presidents to retreat from public life, similar to autocratic leaders in China and Russia
- The statistical risk from attackers is extremely low compared to everyday dangers like texting while driving
- Hardening all public spaces would erode democratic culture and turn society into a permanent security state
- Open societies inherently cannot stop every determined individual attacker without ceasing to be open societies
Assumptions
- Democratic values require accepting some level of risk in exchange for openness and accessibility
- Security measures have diminishing returns and can become counterproductive beyond a certain point
- The current security protocols are generally effective at their intended purpose
- Americans value democratic openness over absolute security when properly informed of the tradeoffs