Turkey's Mecca Pact with Saudi Arabia Risks Repeating the Costly History of Foreign Entanglement in Yemen
Source: Oğul Tuna. "Turkey Risks Being Drawn Into Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen." October 15, 2026. jacobin.com
The Gist
The author argues that by signing a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and starting to help Riyadh against the Houthis, Turkey is stepping into a war that isn't its own. Both the Ottomans and the Saudis failed in Yemen, and everyday people paid the price. Turkey should resist the pull of the alliance and US pressure to go deeper.
Conclusion
Turkey should avoid deeper involvement in Saudi Arabia's war against the Houthis, because the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement risks drawing Turkey into a conflict that is not its own, one that has historically cost ordinary Turks dearly and that serves elites and a US-led regional order rather than ordinary people.
Premises
- Turkey's past intervention in Yemen shows that outside powers can capture towns but cannot control Yemen's terrain and politics, and the costs of such campaigns fell on conscripted ordinary Turks rather than on the elites who decided the war was necessary.
- Saudi Arabia's far wealthier and technologically superior intervention since 2015 also failed to defeat the Houthis, who have survived and grown stronger, which shows that military superiority does not let an outside power reshape Yemen.
- Turkey has already moved from planning to implementation under the Mecca Agreement, providing mainly defensive and technical support to Saudi Arabia and considering further assistance such as air defense and electronic warfare.
- The pact, Saudi requests and US pressure (Trump suggesting he may ask Erdoğan to help) create momentum in which each commitment gives Ankara another reason to make the next, and alliance solidarity makes refusing further involvement harder to defend.
- The conflict is not Turkey's own: Turkey was not attacked, no Turkish territory is occupied, and the escalation stems from the US-Israeli confrontation with Iran, so Turkey's stance that Saudi Arabia should not be dragged into others' wars applies equally to Turkey.
- Ankara's perceived gains in regional influence and defense-industry opportunities benefit the government and arms sellers, not ordinary people, who bear the costs.
Assumptions
- Past Ottoman and Saudi experiences in Yemen are a relevant guide to the risks of Turkey's present involvement despite changed circumstances and a different scale and type of commitment.
- Incremental, limited support (technical, defensive, intelligence) tends to escalate into deeper involvement (slippery slope or path dependence).
- Ordinary citizens, rather than elites, will bear most of the costs of intervention.
- The war is fundamentally a proxy conflict within the US-Israel versus Iran confrontation rather than a legitimate defense of Saudi sovereignty that Turkey has a real interest in supporting.
- Turkey's political leaders will be subject to alliance and US pressure strong enough to make refusal costly.
- Turkey's strategic and economic gains from the Saudi relationship are outweighed by the risks and costs of entanglement.