Litigation Has Failed to Restrain Big Tech, So Organized Labor and Public Control Are Needed
Source: Rob Larson. "Lawsuits Can’t Restrain Big Tech." October 22, 2026. jacobin.com
The Gist
Big Tech companies have lost major court cases, but the punishments have been so mild that the companies' power is barely touched. Fines are small compared with their profits, and the rules imposed are weak or easy to dodge. The author concludes that courts won't fix the problem and that worker organizing and public control, even nationalization, are needed instead.
Conclusion
Legal strategies (antitrust suits and private/state-led harm litigation) are inadequate to restrain Big Tech's power, so organized tech workers and a political movement for real regulation and public control, up to and including nationalization of key algorithms and networks, are needed.
Premises
- In the Google search and ad tech antitrust cases, courts found Google to be an illegal monopolist but declined structural breakups, imposing only limited behavioral remedies (bans on exclusive default deals, data sharing, interoperability, a monitor) that last a shorter time than the government sought and are subject to appeal.
- Private and state suits against Meta over addictive platform design have succeeded in court and produced settlements, but the financial penalties are small relative to Meta's profits (up to $18 billion paid over a decade, roughly one quarter's net income, with only 70% guaranteed).
- The behavioral requirements imposed on Meta, such as teen accounts with night mode, school mode, and time limits, are weak and easily circumvented by teens.
- Remaining cases (DOJ v. Apple, FTC v. Amazon, thousands of civil suits against Meta) are still pending and, based on the pattern so far, do not look promising for meaningfully constraining the firms.
- Alternative forces are emerging, such as tech worker organizing and political proposals like Bernie Sanders's call for a 50 percent public stake in major AI companies, which could impose real constraints from within or through public ownership.
Assumptions
- The proper measure of success for antitrust and harm litigation is whether it structurally curtails the companies' power, not whether it establishes liability or yields compensation.
- Breakups and penalties large relative to corporate profits are necessary for effective restraint; behavioral remedies and modest fines cannot suffice.
- The pattern of outcomes in a few high-profile cases generalizes to the legal system's overall capacity to restrain Big Tech.
- The liberal state and courts are structurally unwilling or unable to impose serious constraints on large corporations.
- Worker organizing and public ownership would be more effective and feasible than legal and regulatory approaches.
- Nationalization of algorithms and networks would not create worse problems (e.g., state control of information platforms).