Institutionalize Discipline, Accountability, and Community Trust to Prevent Marine Misconduct on Okinawa
Source: https://www.facebook.com/americanspectator/. "What I Learned Commanding US Marines on Okinawa | The American Spectator | USA News and Politics." October 11, 2026. spectator.org
The Gist
The author, a retired Marine colonel who ran Camp Hansen after the 1995 Okinawa rape case, says he rebuilt local trust by setting clear rules, holding every level of command accountable, and befriending the neighboring town. He argues that today's leaders are making the mistake of reacting with blanket restrictions, and should make his approach permanent policy so history does not repeat.
Conclusion
Marine Corps leaders on Okinawa should adopt, as permanent institutional policy, the approach of clear conduct standards, leader accountability, and sustained community engagement that the author used at Camp Hansen, rather than reactive collective restrictions, or another crisis is inevitable.
Premises
- The current Marine leadership response to the recent alleged murder (alcohol ban, 'reflection' stand-down, curfew) is reactive, punishes the many for the acts of one, and avoids accepting leadership responsibility.
- After the 1995 rape, the author commanded Camp Hansen and was tasked with repairing relations with the local community, and he did so by setting clear, specific conduct rules ('three big Don'ts') and making the entire chain of command answerable for any violation.
- He also built trust with the neighboring town of Kincho through regular social events, joint community projects, disaster cooperation, and joint welcome talks for new rotating units with the mayor.
- During his two-year command there was only one minor 'big D' incident, no serious incidents occurred on his watch or his successor's, and other installations were encouraged to adopt similar policies.
- Institutional memory in large organizations fades, and the same kind of crime has recurred three decades later, showing that the earlier lessons were not institutionalized.
Assumptions
- The success at Camp Hansen was caused by the author's policies rather than by other factors such as timing, heightened post-1995 scrutiny, or the personalities involved.
- Methods that worked at one 5,000-person camp in the 1990s can scale to all of Okinawa's installations and fit today's conditions.
- Collective restrictions such as curfews and alcohol bans are ineffective or unjust, while individual and chain-of-command accountability is more effective.
- Better community trust and leadership accountability can meaningfully reduce the risk of violent crime by individual servicemembers.
- The recent incident is comparable in cause to the 1995 case and reflects a command-climate problem rather than the actions of one individual.