Europe Faces a Triple Threat but Its Core Institutions (EU and NATO) Are Structurally Unfit to Respond
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/profile/nathalie-tocci. "Europe is under attack from three sides – but the EU and Nato are unfit to defend us | Nathalie Tocci | The Guardian." September 21, 2026. www.theguardian.com
The Gist
The author argues that Europe is facing a triple threat—Russian aggression, an unreliable Trump-led US, and rising far-right nationalism at home—but its main defense institutions, NATO and the EU, are too slow, too US-dependent, or too narrow to handle it. She supports new ideas like a flexible 'security council' and offering countries like Canada and the UK special EU-linked status, but warns that the messenger (EU chief von der Leyen) might undermine these good ideas due to her controversial reputation.
Conclusion
Europe urgently needs new, more agile forms of cooperation (like a European security council and flexible EU associate membership) because NATO and the EU, as currently structured, are unfit to defend Europe against the converging threats of Russia, an unreliable/hostile US, and the internal rise of the far right.
Premises
- Russia is escalating hybrid and military aggression against Europe (e.g., the Leipzig airport explosion, drone strikes near Poland, incidents in Lithuania and Denmark), suggesting Putin believes he can act with impunity.
- The US under Trump cannot be relied upon to defend Europe, as evidenced by his hostility toward the EU (tariff threats) and general antipathy, meaning NATO's core deterrent function is compromised since the US is its 'majority shareholder.'
- The rise of the far right within Europe (e.g., AfD's success in German regional elections) constitutes a third, internal threat that fuels division and plays into the divide-and-rule strategies of external predatory powers.
- NATO's collective defense mechanism is rendered moot if the US signals unwillingness to invoke it, especially in ambiguous hybrid-attack scenarios that fall short of full armed aggression.
- The EU is institutionally slow, cumbersome, and built for peacetime, making it ill-suited to respond rapidly to security crises, and its membership excludes key strategic partners like the UK, Canada, and Ukraine.
- Von der Leyen's proposals (emergency protocol, European security council, associate membership for Canada/UK/Ukraine) are sensible responses that fill the gap between full mutual defense treaties and having no mechanism at all.
- Von der Leyen's reputation for centralizing power and overstepping boundaries risks undermining acceptance of these proposals by jealous, sovereignty-guarding EU member states.
Assumptions
- European nations share enough common interest and identity ('the rest of the west') to cooperate more closely despite internal divisions.
- Non-EU/NATO countries like Canada, the UK, and Ukraine would be willing and effective partners in a new security arrangement.
- Institutional reform (new councils, associate memberships) can meaningfully address strategic vulnerabilities faster than reforming NATO or the EU itself.
- The far-right's rise is primarily driven by or exploited by external adversarial powers, rather than being a purely domestic political phenomenon.
- Political will exists or can be mustered among European leaders to adopt significant institutional changes despite historical resistance to ceding sovereignty.
- The characterization of Russia's actions as a coordinated escalation (rather than isolated incidents) is accurate.