DOJ's Revival of Maritime Prize Law Against Iranian Oil Tankers Is a Justified and Superior Legal Strategy
Source: Jay Rogers. "The US Can Use Maritime Prize Law Against Iranian Oil Tankers." September 4, 2026. thefederalist.com
The Gist
The author argues that the U.S. government is smart to dust off an old legal tool called 'prize law' to seize Iranian oil tankers, because it's faster and more direct than the forfeiture process currently used. He frames this as America finally being willing to act like a winner instead of apologizing for asserting its power, and points to a similar approach being used against Venezuela as evidence this is a broader, coherent strategy.
Conclusion
The Justice Department's revival of maritime prize law to seize Iranian (and by extension Venezuelan) oil tankers is a legitimate, constitutionally grounded, and strategically superior alternative to civil forfeiture, and the U.S. should embrace it without apology.
Premises
- Prize law is an established constitutional mechanism, explicitly granted to Congress in the Constitution's 'Captures on Land and Water' clause and confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1794 (Glass v. The Sloop Betsey).
- Prize law has a long historical pedigree, running continuously from the Revolutionary War through the Spanish-American War before falling into disuse.
- Prize law is faster and more efficient than civil forfeiture, as demonstrated by the multi-month delays in the 2020 Iranian tanker case and the ongoing Venezuelan Skipper case, compared to the weeks prize law would require.
- The current conflict with Iran (strikes beginning Feb. 28, ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz) provides a live armed-conflict context that could trigger prize jurisdiction.
- Iran's fuel reserves are reportedly nearing exhaustion, suggesting that faster asset seizure via prize law would meaningfully increase pressure on the regime.
- The same doctrine is already being applied analogously in Venezuela (tanker seizures and the new oil concession deal), suggesting a coherent and expanding U.S. strategy of asset capture from adversarial regimes.
- The U.S. has historically been overly hesitant about openly asserting the rights of a victor to captured enemy property, and this hesitancy has been noticed and exploited by adversaries.
Assumptions
- A legally recognizable 'armed conflict' with Iran exists or can be established, despite the absence of a formal congressional declaration of war.
- Faster asset seizure will meaningfully translate into strategic pressure on Iran's government rather than simply enriching private claimants or creating prolonged litigation.
- The moral/rhetorical framing of 'to the victor go the spoils' is an appropriate justification for state action, rather than something requiring a more neutral legal justification.
- Applying prize law to tankers where formal war has not been declared is a natural and legitimate extension of the doctrine's historical scope.
- The reader will accept that speed and decisiveness in seizure procedures are inherently good, independent of due process concerns for third parties (owners, insurers, neutral carriers).